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The short answer to this question is that the sector is undercapitalised, too large and 
contains  too  many  players  without  a  viable  long-term  business  model.  It  is  the 
combination  of  the  last  two  factors  that  constitutes  the  most  serious  and  most 
difficult problem.  
The size of the banking sector is a cause for concern because, with total liabilities over 
250% of GDP (for the eurozone), it is clear that the emergence of any major problem 
could over-burden public budgets. In short, the banking sector in Europe might be 
‘too big to be saved’.  
The problem of undercapitalisation can be cured by an infusion of new capital. But 
the larger the banking sector, the more difficult this becomes. Moreover, it simply 
does not make sense to put new capital into banks that cannot return profits any time 
in the foreseeable future 
The difficulties in southern Europe are well known, but they differ fundamentally 
from one country to another. In Spain banks have over the years issued hundreds of 
billions  of  euros  worth  of  30-year  mortgages,  whose  interest rates  are indexed  to 
interbank rates (Euribor), with a small spread (often less than 100 basis points) fixed 
for the lifetime of the mortgage. This was a profitable model at a time when Spanish 
banks  were  able  to  refinance  themselves  at  a  spread  much  lower  than  100  basis 
points. But today Spanish banks, especially those most heavily engaged in domestic 
mortgage lending, have to pay much more than 100 basis points spread over inter-
bank rates on their own cost of funding. Many local Spanish banks can thus stay 
afloat  only  because  they  refinance  a  large  share  of  their  mortgage  book  via  the 
European Central Bank. But reliance on cheap central bank (re)financing does not 
represent a viable business model.   
In  Italy  the  difficulties  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  banks  have  over  the  years 
continued  to  lend  to  domestic  enterprises,  especially  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), while GDP has not grown. The productivity of capital investment 
in  Italy  was  thus  close  to  zero  even  before  the  crisis.  The  onset  of  the  present 
recession has exposed this low productivity, as many SMEs are failing, leading to 2 | DANIEL GROS 
 
large losses for the banks. But funding costs have increased. It is thus difficult to see 
how Italian banks can return to profitability (and the country can resume growth) 
unless the allocation of capital is radically changed. 
But there even are problems north of the Alps. In Germany banks have deposited 
hundreds of billions of euros in excess liquidity at the ECB on which they earn close 
to nothing. But their funding costs are not zero.  German banks might be able to issue 
securities at very low rates, but even these rates are higher than what they earn on 
their deposits at the ECB. Moreover, they have to factor in the cost of maintaining an 
extensive and thus expensive domestic retail network through which they collect the 
savings deposits, which they now have difficulties remunerating. 
There will of course always be some banks that do better and others that suffer from 
these negative trends. Thus one cannot avoid the task of analysing the situation of 
each  bank  separately.  But  it  is  clear  that  in  an  environment  of  low  growth,  low 
interest rates but high risk premia, many banks struggle to merely survive. 
Unfortunately, the problem cannot be left to the markets to resolve. A bank without a 
viable business model does not shrink gradually and then disappear. Its share price 
might decline towards zero, but its retail customers will be blissfully unaware of the 
difficulties, and other creditors will also continue to provide financing because they 
expect that in the end the (national) authorities will intervene before the bank fails by 
either  providing  emergency  funding  or  by  arranging  a  merger  with  another 
institution. The recent official tough talk about the need to ‘bail in’ bank creditors has 
not impressed markets much, not least because the new rules on potentially inflicting 
losses on creditors of failing banks are supposed to enter into force only by 2018. 
Starting next year, the ECB will undertake a review of the quality of the assets of the 
banks under its supervision, but it will not be able review the longer-term viability of 
business  models.  The  present  owners  will  resist  to  the  end  any  dilution  of  their 
control;  and  no  national  authority  is  likely  to  acknowledge  that  their  national 
‘champion’ lacks a plausible path to financial viability.   
Keeping a weak banking system afloat has high economic costs. Banks with too little 
capital, or those without a viable business model, tend to keep extending credit to 
their existing customers even if these loans are of dubious value, and they also tend 
to  restrict  lending  to  new  companies  or  projects.  This  misallocation  of  capital 
hampers any recovery and reduces longer-term growth prospects. 
What should be done is clear:  recapitalise much of the sector and restructure those 
parts lacking a viable business model. But as this is unlikely to happen any time 
soon, it also unlikely that Europe can recover fully from its present slump. 
 
 